Secretary of State Kevin Shelley gave the following address before the Voting Systems Panel and members of the public during the presentation of the results of an audit of (Diebold Election Systems) hardware, software, and firmware installed in 17 California counties.

After Secretary Shelley completed his speech, the audit results were presented. The audit revealed that among the random selection of Diebold's systems in those 17 counties, NO instances of certified software were discovered. Further, it was determined that in Los Angeles and 2 other counties, the firmware in use on the audited machines had never been submitted for Federal certification. (By California law, all election equipment must be certified at the Federal level and then approved by the State.)

It was further revealed that all of these machines were used in their uncertified configurations in both the November 2003 and the October "Recall" elections.

After the disclosure of the audit results, Assistant Secretary of State Marc Carrel announced his disgust and frustration with the revelations. However, the entire results of the audit were not available on that date, and the remainder of the audit discussion was scheduled for January 15, 2004. VerifiedVoting.org is urging all interested members of the public to attend the upcoming January 15th meeting in order to demonstrate strong support for a voter-verified audit trail as well as stronger enforcement of certification procedures.

Members of the Voting Systems Panel and Ladies and Gentleman behind me, I understand, from staff, that I, as Secretary of State, am breaking precedent by appearing before this panel. I appreciate all of the sage advice that you give me and recommendations that you make, but I felt it appropriate to break precedent, given the circumstance of the item you are hearing and discussing at the moment. My concern is beyond the individual item that is being discussed as it applies to Diebold and the recommendations to be made in that regard. It's much larger than that.

The core of our American democracy, members, is the right to vote. And implicit in that right is the notion that that vote be private, that vote be secure, and that vote be counted as it was intended when it was cast by the voter. I think what we're encountering is a pivotal moment in our democracy where all that is being called into question – the privacy of the vote, the security of the vote, and the accuracy of the vote. It troubles me, and it should trouble you.

Now, initial presentation was just made on the findings of the report, and I want to thank you very much for conducting the study and for the important review you provided. I know the VSP will soon be asking questions and then making some recommendations, but there are a number of things that this report details that are very troubling. There were unqualified uses of software that had not been approved by the Federal government; there were uncertified uses of software that had not been certified by the State government; and the software was used in a number of instances. That is deeply troubling because it's a violation of the elections code. There were lax accounting procedures, whether it be by counties or whether it be by this very agency, where we have not had a sufficiently extensive mechanism to assess, on a regular basis, what systems were in use.

I think that, on the county level, the audit reinforces my comments on American democracy – that on the county level, the physical security of the voting is sound and the county registrars and their excellent staff are doing a very good job in ensuring that security, but that the technical security is less sound, and the procedures that should be and must be in place at the county level are not sufficiently in place now.

At the same time, we – the Secretary of State’s office, the entity the election code charges with the responsibility to certify systems – bear responsibility if we're not on a consistent and regular basis assessing what software systems are in place. I believe we have the finest elections staff of any Secretary of State operation in the country (no disrespect to the other forty nine). Having said that, for every state election program, it's a new era and we must adjust our procedures, our assessment mechanisms, our approaches towards assuring the privacy, accuracy, security, and integrity of those votes. Now I know a number of recommendations will be made today. I look forward to implementing the recommendations of this panel to provide, from this office’s perspective, stronger mechanisms to address them – be it bi-annual assessments, be it regular auditing, be it spot checks, be it a number of things that came out of the recommendations of the touch screen task force.

You know it's very interesting that, recently when I made the decision to require a paper audit trail, a number of county officials very respectfully denounced them and a number of vendors, many of whom are represented behind me, said it wasn't necessary, said their machinery was secure. At the same time, a number of those within the community, the voter advocacy community, have oft times alleged Armageddon if we don't make immediate changes. Well you know, I don't know who's right.

I'm like the average voter. I don't know. And because I don't know, I want the confidence that a paper trail provides. And like an average voter, I want the confidence that a stronger assessment mechanism at the state level will provide. And like the average voter, I want the confidence that stronger procedures at the county level will ensure the accuracy, integrity and privacy of those votes. Once again, the right to vote is the most precious demonstration of our democracy. We must take it seriously, we must cherish it, and all of us, at the county level, at this office, and in the election vendor community, must act accordingly.

Now the audit is not complete. We don't have all the findings as yet, and we don't know what's occurred comprehensively. I would hope that the end result sanction that we suggested we might make today, pursuant to this hearing taking place, won't be the suggestion of de-certification of Diebold systems. I would hope that won't be the case. I certainly hope that won't be the case with other vendors as well. But if we find that there are gross discrepancies and violations, I am prepared to go down that road, and so this needs to be taken very, very seriously. And with that, I thank you for your time and I'll let you continue with your hearing.